The EEAS Part 3: Can the EU fix its foreign policy?

Main things

problem -> proposal (france + berlin) and what they wanted before INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES -> who gains/loses greater centralisation favours who? are member states weakened (CFSP already intergov)? does europe inherently need 1 foreign policy apparatus? will reform solve the problem? does it need stronger EC, or just a clearer division of powers?

• strenghten kallas (and high representative function)
• greater centralisation to the EC, and the commission president who has now the final say
• More connected and interweaved foreign policy (no duplicate competencies)
• decreased spending (current institutions are in use)
• no treaty changes?

problem

issues in acting abroad, is it no longer fit?

• Russias war on ukraine
• Ukraine reconstruction
• Chinese aggresive confrontational policy
• donald trump demands
• conflict in middle east

+ berlin presses cuts amid new long term budget 2027-2029

Back in 2010, after the Treaty of Lisbon created the High Representative, the Council of the EU reached an agreement which ended with the creation of the EEAS. Member States were not willing to centralise foreign policy enough to create an independent European foreign service, while still requiring an external-facing relations apparatus. An institution was therefore created that hung between the Council and the Commission, one which was able to coordinate the Union's foreign policy while not significantly reducing capitals' diplomatic sovereignty.

This compromise, "hashed out in a messy compromise at three in the morning", as said by Pierre Sellal in an interview for POLITICO, was possible; however, only due to several questions left without a definitive answer.

"The original concept for the EEAS was ambitious, but the implementation (against the background of the financial crisis) was not.", said Stefan Lehne, former director for the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, serving the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.

At a time when the focus of Member States was on domestic economic policy, the EEAS was created as a traditional diplomatic and security service, without consideration of various instruments, which were beginning to become one of the EU's biggest vulnerabilities. What started as a compromise during the creation of the institution behind European diplomacy resulted in its diminishing influence.

All of these sectors are either a prerogative of the Commission or Member States. The former has not ignored the opportunity to steer external policy direction.

The most notable instance of this is a push by the Commission for the European Defence Union (EDU) to direct defence policy through regulation and investment, instead of classical diplomacy on which Kallas' service was built. Despite the different means of implementation, Joseph Borrell pointed out similarities with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - the existing EU framework for defence policy - which was created by capitals and enforced by the EEAS. Through the Commission's influence over manufacturing, industry, and financial support, it was able to exert defence policy without having the formal authority to do so.

The Commission has also utilised its influence abroad. The Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf was created to expand von der Leyen's role in the region. Interests include economic cooperation, such as the recently introduced Pact for the Mediterranean, counter-terrorism measures, and pressure from irregular migration - all within the bounds of "external representation" the EU treaty has set. Yet the line blurs further in actions such as Commissioner Dubravka Šuica's trip to Israel on June 22nd, aimed at promoting regional security and emphasising the importance of "sincere, comprehensive, and open dialogue", which happened despite Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar severing all contact with HR/VP Kaja Kallas over comments comparing Israel's treatment of Palestinians with apartheid-era South Africa.

dont villanise the commission, make her effectively enacting policy

the letter

Letter by 11 capitals how the CFSP (common foreign security policy) can speed up and efficiency in decision making. also intro to moving away from unanimous voting

germany pushes for move to QMV (qualified majority voting) but france and other against increasing eu power. letter pro-qmv

signed by: Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain in addition to France and Germany. "We continue to strive for consensus wherever possible, but we must also ensure that this culture of consensus fosters common action rather than preventing it — otherwise we will have legitimacy but no strength."

• sincere cooperation (honour commitment despite legally not binding)
• constructive abstention, not veto
• ban "if u dont pass [insert random bill] ill veto this" (linkage of unrelated matters"
• encourage hrvp to explore treaty based options. -> Passerelle clause (allows eu to change decision-making rules without treaty change, ex QMV for voting on FSP matters)
• emphesize need for countries to say why tf they vetoing

franco-german letter talks about kallas executive vp of the EC, oversight over external-facing policy in: trade, dev aid, defence. so more, in a new department for external relations. part of oversightees dispersed across dgs like MENA and ENEST. staff of sec&def policy remain in eeas with 1/3 seconded diplomats remains. underlines member states role in foreign policy, with HRVP reporting to EU foreign ministers to foreign policy, and receive instructions during european council gatherings.

the proposal

• gives ursula vonderleyen more power, HRVP working under her
• EEAS staff inegrated into eu executive
• things such as eu's peacekeeping may remain outside EC
• employees support kallas's role, but allow EC taking over more foreign policy, defragmentarising it

apart from franco-german discussion paper, send to kallas an open letter by 11 capitals, includiong paris+berlin. letter opens door to votes by majority, not necessarily unanimouns

pushback

• Kajsa Ollongren, new SG, touring capitals to talkign about reform proposals
• issues not from current institutional setup, but poor implementation & bad rules
• Ollongren - 'council of elders task force' to reflect on possible reforms (contains senior diplomats like Belén Martínez Carbonell and Charles Fries)
• eu foreign ministers meeting in wicklow about potential reforms, kallas reports "majority" against (so will be veto)
• eu treaties and legal texts, according to kallas, give HRVP oversight of commissions external policy, which can be done without major reform. agrees with statemenet that foreing policy needs to be faster, and protect blocs interest better

“The problem is not the treaties, the institutional setup,” she said. “The problem is the implementation.”

Does it work? will it give eeas a bigger voice in the debate over its future?

how its going